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Costs of Meat and Poultry Recalls to Food Firms
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Recalls of meat, poultry and processed eggs
occur under the supervision of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS). Typically, meat
and poultry products that have already been
shipped and distributed into the market and
are suspected of being potentially hazardous
to public health, are voluntarily recalled by
firms either by their own initiative or at the
request of FSIS. A recall can occur for many
different reasons including: foodborne illness
outbreaks; products contaminated with
foreign materials; mislabeling; undeclared
allergens; underprocessed or undercooked
products.
From 1994 to 2013 FSIS reported almost
1,300 meat and poultry recalls, representing
approximately 638 million lb. of product.
Nearly three-fourths of the recalls correspond
to the most severe class of recalls (see box).
Such recalls come at the expense of the firms
directly involved and can generate substantial
economic losses.
As a preventive measure, food firms
invest substantial resources to reduce the
probability of food safety hazards. However,
determining optimal investment is elusive
because food contamination incidents are
difficult to predict and even more, their
probable economic impact is unknown.
Assessing the economic impact that may
result from a food recall entails a thorough
understanding of the costs incurred by firms.
However, direct measurement of a firm’s
total costs and losses of revenue requires
firm-level data that are not generally

FSIS Recall Classification
The most severe class of recalls are Class I.
Class I recalls involve a “situation where
there is a reasonable probability that the use
of the product will cause serious, adverse
health consequences or death.” For example,
these recalls involve meat products
contaminated with foodborne bacteria such
as Escherichia coli O157:H7, Listeria
monocytogenes or Salmonella.
Class II recalls involve a “situation where
there is a remote probability of adverse health
consequences from the use of the product.”
For example, a Class II recall is issued when
products contain small amounts of
undeclared allergens typically associated
with milder human reactions.
The least severe class of recalls are Class
III. These recalls involve a “situation where
the use of the product will not cause adverse
health consequences.” For example, a Class
III recall may involve products that contain
excess water.

available. To overcome this limitation, we
analyzed price reactions in financial markets
during the period surrounding recall events.
We expect the effects of a food recall would
be rapidly reflected in stock market prices.
As such, the magnitude of stock price
reactions represents the expected costs
incurred by the implicated firms. This
magnitude of stock market reactions can be
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used to assess the benefits of implementing
new technologies or food safety protocols,
and also, adoption of industry food safety
management systems (Salin and Hooker,
2001).
Meat and Poultry Recalls from Publicly
Traded Firms
FSIS issued a total of 1,271 recalls from
January 1994 to December 2013. Among
these, we identified 163 recalls from 31
different publicly traded firms. The recalls
involve beef, pork, chicken, turkey and other
miscellaneous meat products, consisting of a
large selection ranging from meat products
such as ground beef or sausage, to products
where meat is only one of many ingredients
such as pizza or soup. Products recalled come
in different package presentations and are
sold raw, cooked or ready-to-eat.
Recalls from publicly traded firms
account for almost 45% of the total amount
of product recalled during the past two
decades, about 278 million lb. For publicly
traded companies, 115 recalls were Class I,
39 Class II, and 9 Class III. Table 1
summarizes the number of recalls by publicly
traded firms. ConAgra, Sara Lee and Thorn
Apple Valley realized almost 70% of the total
product volume recalled by publicly traded
firms, whereas ConAgra and Tyson Foods
represented 36% of the recalls. Tyson Foods,
with the largest number of recalls at 35, is not
the company that recalled the largest amount
of product having just under 5 million lb.
recalled. Sara Lee had the largest product
volume recalled with nearly 38 million lb.
across 13 recall events.

predicted stock price returns, expected when
there had not been a recall event. Next,
abnormal returns were aggregated across
time and recall events to estimate the overall
impact of meat and poultry recalls on stock
price returns. This measure is known as
cumulative average abnormal returns
Table 1. Summary of Meat and Poultry Recalls
from Publicly Traded Firms by Firm, 1994-2013.
Ticker

Company

No.

Pounds

AHP
BOBE
CAG
COST
CPB
DEG
DLM
GIS
HAIN
HFI
HNZ
HRL
IBP
K
KFT
KR
NSRGY
PPC
SAFM
SFD
SJM
SLE
SVU
SYY
TAVI
THS
TSN
UVV
WFM
WIN
WMK

American Home Products
Bob Evans Farms Inc.
ConAgra Inc.
Costco Wholesale Corp.
Campbell Soup Co.
The Delhaize Group
Del Monte Foods Co.
General Mills Inc.
The Hain Celestial Group
Hudson Foods Inc.
Heinz H. J. Co.
Hormel Foods Corp.
IBP Inc.
Kellogg Co.
Kraft Foods Inc.
Kroger Co.
Nestle SA
Pilgrim’s Pride Corp.
Sanderson Farms Inc.
Smithfield Foods Inc.
Smucker J. M. Co.
Sara Lee Corp.
Supervalu Inc.
Sysco Corp.
Thorn Apple Valley Inc.
TreeHouse Foods Inc.
Tyson Foods Inc.
Universal Corp.
Whole Foods Market Inc.
Winn Dixie Stores Inc.
Weis Markets Inc.

1
1
24
4
9
1
1
1
1
5
3
6
5
1
5
3
13
4
1
13
1
13
2
1
2
3
35
1
1
1
1

150,000
8,500
114,669,426
222,123
16,322,137
Undetermined
31,650
3,300,000
983,700
28,313,959
94,886
234,946
1,160,355
2,790
28,508
490,131
1,689,393
28,806,600
Undetermined
1,007,821
3,000
37,723,229
962
16,800
35,009,936
214,957
4,854,233
578,000
1,275
1,734,002
2,852

163

277,656,171

Total

Stock Price Reactions
We quantified the impact of meat and poultry
recalls on the market value of firms by
obtaining a measure of abnormal returns – the
stock price movement associated with each
specific recall. First, using daily stock price
data for the 31 public firms in our sample, we
calculated actual stock price returns. Then,
abnormal returns were calculated as the
difference between actual stock price returns,
observed during the recall event, and

(CAAR). Table 2 reports the typical
cumulative stock price reactions following a
recall, as a measure of CAAR, for all recalls
and just for Class I recalls. Results are
presented for the day of the recall
announcement (day 0) and up to 20 trading
days after the recall event.
The “All Recalls” column of Table 2
illustrates the typical food recall impact on
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pose the most human health threat. For
example, by day 5 (5 days after the recall
announcement) stock returns decreased on
average 1.15% after a Class I recall. This
means that the average firm in our sample,
with 472 million shares of stock outstanding
and a $20 per share value on the day of a
recall announcement, realized a reduced
value of approximately $109 million in
market equity 5 days after a recall event.
Recognize, some firms realized larger losses
and some realized smaller losses, the results
in Table 2 are averages across firms and
recall events. Class II and Class III recalls did
not have statistically significant stock price
impacts, suggesting that stock markets tend
to only react adversely to Class I recalls likely
because of the health risk involved. These
findings are consistent with Thomsen and
Mckenzie (2001). Figure 1 shows the overall
impact of all recalls and Class I recalls in the
stock market. Price reactions seem to be
persistent over time.

Table 2. Cumulative Stock Price Reactions
following a Meat and Poultry Recall (% change
in stock price associated with the recall).
Day

All Recalls

Class I

0

-0.01

-0.08

1

-0.10

-0.27 *

2

-0.10

-0.36 *

3

-0.29

-0.67 *

4

-0.52 *

-1.05 *

5

-0.63 *

-1.15 *

10

-0.34 **

-1.09 *

15

-0.37

-0.91 *

20

-1.05 *

-1.64 *

* Indicates that the magnitude is statistically lower than

zero at the 0.10 level.

day zero (recall announcement day) and after.
This impact is negative, however, it takes 4
days after the recall event for stock prices to
react in a statistically significant way,
suggesting that the stock market does not
systematically react immediately to all
recalls. Regardless of the recall class, stock
returns decreased, on average, 0.63% within
5 days after the recall event. Stock price

Explaining Stock Price Reactions
Critical to prudent investment decisions
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Figure 1. Average Impact of Meat and Poultry Recall in the Stock Market.

reactions after Class I recalls are larger, in
absolute value, as expected since these recalls

targeted at reducing product recall
probabilities and designing mitigation
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strategies
during
such
events
is
understanding what factors drive the
magnitude of impact of meat and poultry
recalls. Several factors have the potential to
influence this magnitude of impact. For
instance, the seriousness of the human health
risk associated with the event may impact
shareholder losses. Moreover, firms recalling
a large volume of product would be expected
to be impacted more than those experiencing
a small-volume recall. The extent of media
information accompanying a recall event can
decrease consumer demand for the
implicated product (Piggott and Marsh, 2004;
Schlenker and Villas-Boas, 2009). Therefore,
media information can also help explain
stock price reactions.
Firm size, scale of operations and levels
of diversification may also influence how
firm valuation changes in the midst of a food
safety breach. Larger, more diversified firms
are expected to be more able to weather a
food safety recall than small companies.
Additionally, a firm’s past experience
managing recalls can influence the outcome
from contamination incidents on the market
value of firms (Salin and Hooker, 2001;
Wang et al., 2002). That is, firms undertaking
an effective food safety crisis management
strategy may help minimize stock market
reactions.

A description of factors used to explain
stock price reactions is presented in Table 3.
Factors are divided into two groups: those
directly related to the recall event or the firm
issuing the recall and control factors used to
predict stock returns behavior.
Using statistical models we estimated the
relationship between each one of these
factors and the magnitude of impact of meat
and poultry recalls, expressed as CAAR.
Table 4 presents the marginal effect of each
factor on stock price reactions 5, 10 and 15
days after the recall announcement. Focusing
on factors that are statistically significant at
standard levels, Recall Size has a negative
impact on stock returns, holding everything
else constant. The importance of this factor
increases over time following a recall
announcement. On average, when the size of
a recall increases by 170%, compared with
the average recall in our sample of 42,000 lb.,
stock returns become more negative ranging
from -0.27% to -0.42%.
Firm Size indicates that on average, larger
firms experience lesser impacts after a recall,
holding everything else constant. For
example, firms with $11 billon equity (170%
$4 billion) realize a 0.48% less severe stock

Table 3. Factors Explaining Stock Price Reactions.
Factor

Description

Recall and Firm Related Factors
Severity (Class)
Class I, Class II and Class III
Recall Size
Number of pounds recalled
Foodborne Pathogen Recalls caused by a foodborne pathogen
Firm Size
Measured as market equity
Firm’s Experience
Firms involved in a food recall within the last year
HACCP
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) implementation
Media Index
Number of articles published per recall per day
Diversification
Production/sales segment of meat and poultry products
Subsidiary
Recall issued by a subsidiary
Cluster
Other recalls within past 10 days
Control Factors
Momentum
Return over previous 12 months
Initial Shock
Return on event day
Trading Volume
Percentage of shares outstanding that is traded daily

Source
FSIS
FSIS
FSIS
Annual Reports
FSIS
USDA
LexisNexis
Annual Reports
Company Website
FSIS
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
Bloomberg
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Table 4. Effects of Recall and Firm Related factors
on Stock Price Returns (%).
Factor

5-Days
after
Recall

10-Days
after
Recall

15-Days
after
Recall

Class I
Class III
Recall Size
Firm Size
Pathogen
Experience
HACCP
Cluster
Media Index
Diversification
Subsidiary

-0.42
0.86
-0.27
0.48
-0.14
1.29
-0.12
0.44
-0.10
0.51
-0.39

-0.81
1.55
-0.33 *
0.51
-0.02
1.65 *
-1.12
0.43
-0.11 *
0.17
-0.01

-1.06
1.49
-0.42 *
0.40
0.11
1.72 *
-1.43
0.24
-0.08 *
0.01
-0.21

*
*
*

*

* Indicates that effect is statistically significant at the 0.10
level.

return impact 5 days after a recall event.larger
than the average firm in our sample of
Experience has a relatively large
influence on stock price reactions to recalls.
Contrary to logic that firms incurring more
than one recall within the past year might
reflect more negative impact in stock prices
as it could reflect sustained damage to
reputation, the effect of this factor is actually
positive. Recurrent firms have on average
about a 1.29% stronger stock price 5 days
after a recall relative to a firm facing its first
recall in the past year, holding everything
else constant. This result is consistent with
Salin and Hooker (2001). Apparently,
investors take into consideration the past
performance of a company when dealing
with product recalls as they adjust firm
valuations. When a firm efficiently follows
the protocols for managing a recall event and
establishes clear communication channels
with stakeholders, it sends a good signal to
the stock market, and investors appear to be
more comfortable that another recall is not as
major of a threat as is the first recall in recent
history. This does not imply that the second
recall is a net positive event for the company,
but that the impact of the recall on stock price
is likely to be less severe. A firm that
survived a recent recall event may provide
confidence to investors that the firm can deal
effectively with a new recall.

Media Index has a negative impact in
stock returns, holding everything else
constant. For example, one additional recallrelated article published within 5 days after
the recall announcement, decreases stock
returns by 0.10%, on average.
Implications
Several implications for food companies,
particularly regarding recall management
arise from our analysis. One implication is
related to recall size. Firms should try to
rapidly identify contaminated products,
perhaps by testing products in smaller lots, so
that recalls of massive amounts of product are
less likely. Large recalls are immensely
costly to the firm and result in sizeable stock
price impacts which can potentially result in
firm bankruptcies. Regarding firm size, small
firms should consider investing more of the
total firms’ value in food safety technologies
and protocols as they have greater risk of
bankruptcy in the event of a recall.
Another implication is related to the
firm’s experience, which is more precisely
measuring the experience that recurrent firms
have on managing food recalls. Recurrent
firms appear to have less stock devaluation
for the same recall compared to firms
experiencing a recall for the first time. Firms
with limited experience handling a food
recall, can learn from recurrent firms that
have successfully managed food recalls.
The implication of media information is
that once news reaches the public, it will have
a negative impact on the firm’s market value.
Therefore, having a plan in place to deal with
this situation is important. Recommendations
concerning appropriate strategies for
managing the influence of media fall outside
of the scope of our analysis. Nevertheless,
companies need to be ready to implement
plans to try to reduce adverse impacts of
media while dealing with a food recall.
Finally, since factors such as firm size,
recall size and media information can
potentially cause substantial shareholder
losses, investors may want to know more
about the firm’s food safety experience and
strategy before investing.
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